If there is one problem that has plagued the Gators more than any other recently, it’s turnovers.
Coughing it up 18 times against Missouri was a tough pill to swallow considering the Gators only lost by two, and following up that performance with 16 turnovers against Tennessee illuminated the problem even more.
This is a team that struggles to control the ball.
Florida is currently 261st in the country in turnover percentage, giving away the ball on 20.7% of possessions. That’s easily the worst mark in the Mike White era, only three years removed from the 2017-18 season where Florida was 6th in the country in ball security with a turnover percentage of 14.2%.
Turnovers have been a major part of Mike White’s frustration with the team recently and players have talked about the issue on plenty of occasions as well. In the loss against Kentucky the Gators turned it over 16 times and against Florida State they turned it over 20 times, so the correlation between turnovers and losses is tough to ignore.
When talking about the problem, Coach White has repeatedly said focus had been lacking from Florida’s players and that contributed to the constant barrage of turnovers.
That could definitely be the case, but focus is tough to quantify. Now, just because something isn’t quantifiable that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist, but what if Florida’s turnover problems could be pinpointed to something more than the occasional careless pass or sloppy turnover.
Analytics, particularly play type data, can inform us a bunch regarding Florida’s turnovers and get to the root of what has caused the turnovers. Perhaps it will show us that Florida’s turnovers aren’t just a result of a lack of focus.
Let’s start by taking a look at Florida’s favorite half court offense set–the pick and roll. Florida uses multiple pick and roll plays that space the floor in a variety of ways but ultimately the goal of these sets is to run a ball screen.
The Gators LOVE the pick and roll. 31% of their offensive possessions use the pick and roll, making them one of the most pick and roll reliant teams in the country.
When Florida runs pick and rolls, they have a 22% turnover rate.
If you recall, their overall turnover rate is 20.7%, which is 261st in the country. That means that their pick and roll turnover rate is very poor, and considering they have a bad turnover rate on a play that they run 31% of the time, you can see why they are turning the ball over so much.
When the pick and roll ball handler calls his own number and tries to score the Gators have a 23.6% turnover rate.
When the ball handler passes out of the pick and roll, the Gators have a 25.8% turnover rate.
Obviously, neither of these numbers are particularly flattering. It’s worth noting that most teams turn the ball over more on pick and rolls than on any other play type in the half court, but that national average is at a 18.9% turnover rate, still well below Florida’s.
The pick and roll turnover data matters because it really helps contextualize Florida’s pick and turnover problems.
The pick and roll is historically a high-turnover play. The data from this season also shows that the turnover rate on pick and rolls is higher than any other play.
So, if Florida is going to run pick and rolls on 31% of their possessions, a play that is inherently going to result in more turnovers…perhaps they shouldn’t be surprised by the results.
Of course, there is still plenty of room for improvement, even in a play that is going to result in more turnovers. That could start with who Florida chooses to use in pick and rolls.
There are five Gators that have used a high number of pick and rolls this season. Predictably, they are Tre Mann, Tyree Appleby, Scottie Lewis, Noah Locke, and Ques Glover.
Let’s look at Florida’s turnover rate in pick and rolls initiated by each of these players.
Tre Mann: 16.7%
Tyree Appleby: 19.6%
Noah Locke: 28.9%
Ques Glover: 22.1%
Scottie Lewis: 38.1%
Understandably, Florida’s two best ball handlers and two best passers in Tre Mann and Tyree Appleby have the lowest turnover percentage. They also have the highest pick and roll usage, as 50.2% of Mann’s usage and 46.3% of Appleby’s comes in the pick and roll.
Where the numbers are far less flattering is for Noah Locke and Scottie Lewis whose turnover rates are poor. You might think that would disqualify them from the right to run pick and rolls–but that isn’t the case. In the last 8 games the pick and roll usage for these two players has nearly doubled from the previous chunk of the season, and we’re now at the point where 23.3% of Noah Locke’s, a player known as a spot up shooter first, second, and third, offense is coming from the pick and roll. Locke also has logged 5 possessions in the last 3 games as a pick and roll ball handler coming out of a timeout, meaning that the Gators legitimately called a play for him to be an initiator.
Knowing these numbers, if turnovers are truly the concern for the Gators (which they should be) a natural start would be to stop allowing players other than Tre Mann or Tyree Appleby to initiate pick and rolls. The chances of a turnover are far too high, and the return on investment is clearly not there. Here is Florida’s points per possession on pick and rolls initiated by each guard:
Tre Mann: 1.05 PPP
Tyree Appleby: 0.93 PPP
Noah Locke: 0.75 PPP
Scottie Lewis: 0.75 PPP
Ques Glover: 0.68 PPP
Not trying to be rude, but here’s the fact of the matter. Any pick and roll ran by players not named Tre or Tyree on the Gators is an inefficient play call with a poor return on investment and a sky-high opportunity cost.
To simplify–pick and rolls ran by Florida’s secondary playmakers are unlikely to produce points and are highly likely to produce turnovers.
To simplify more–those are bad plays.
Florida has two fantastic pick and roll guards in Tre Mann and Tyree Appleby. Any time Florida calls a play for someone else to run a pick and roll, they are downgrading their offense and greatly increasing their chances at turning the ball over.
We are deep into the season and have a good sample size of how players turn the ball over. If they continue to run plays where they put players in positions where they have turned the ball over a lot this season, they can’t be surprised by the results.
On a different note, here’s something that might surprise you.
Want to know something the Gators could do to limit turnovers?
Push the ball in transition.
This might sound counterintuitive, as historically people have thought about playing fast as a way to turn the ball over. In the past few seasons when Florida hasn’t played as fast as people expected, one of the reasons Coach White gave for slowing it down was that if they played faster they would turn the ball over a ton.
Right now, Florida’s turnover rate in transition is 15.1%.
That is far lower than their overall turnover rate of 20.7%. And, it’s on a sample size of 387 fast break opportunities, which is significant and speaks to the fact that Florida doesn’t turn the ball over much when they push the ball.
In fact, they are far more likely to turn the ball over running pick and rolls, their favorite set, than they are to turn the ball over in transition. This will certainly shock and awe some people, but this is why analytics and numbers are helpful–they can give you facts that might go against convention.
Florida’s issues with turnovers have been labeled as a problem related to focus. That has definitely played a huge part in the issue, no question. However, there are some tangible ways that the Gators can improve on these problems. We have the data that shows what players are more likely to turn the ball over out of pick and roll, so they should stop putting those players in a position where they are likely to fail. It would be better for the team, and better for the player.
They also can look to play faster. At this point of the season half court defenses are dialed in and scouting reports pointing out various players’ tendencies are advanced. Playing on the break has been a way the Gators have been efficient offensively and safe with the ball this season, so they should look to lean into that aspect of their offensive game.
Turnovers are a part of basketball and they’re going to happen. What you’d probably like to see is the Gators limiting that part of their game by leaning into players who have had success in particular play types and limit turnovers by secondary options put in positions they’re probably not going to succeed in. If Florida turns the ball over with Tre Mann and Tyree Appleby doing what they do best, so be it. But, if the Gators put Noah Locke and Scottie Lewis into positions where they have turned the ball over a ton, they shouldn’t be surprised by the results.
It seems like the problem is simple- predictability. Despite being an above average offensive team, the team’s offense is predictable. When something becomes predictable it becomes reasonably thwartable at least enough to outscore a team that is superior offensively.
None of this would matter if we rebounded and played tougher defense.
There are times that White is going to have to play Payne, Casteleton, Jitoboh and Duruji (or Lewis), none of which run the offense and dribble extensively. Such a lineup will make us one of the tallest and therefore harder to score on teams in the paint in America. Payne, Duruji and Castleton ALL run the floor well in transition and can finish on the move. Our fast break offense does not have to be diminished because of size. It makes us unpredicatable and more importantly, it diminishes the percentage of the time that we have to be predictable. That leaves Mann to control the ball almost exclusively, or Appleby or Glover or Lewis or Locke.
White has to honestly and without regard to feelings being hurt, look at those 5 and measure them from top to bottom as far as reliability is concerned. And when the tall line up is in, leave the ball responsibility to one person – and the point, who now has at least one other semi reliable shooter in the wing in Duruji or Lewis, can take the shot themselves or pass to one of three 6’10” post players to get the shot. One of those 6’10” guys HAS TO – HAS TO have a mismatch. So instead of our team always playing a player 7 inches taller, the shoe will be on the other foot. Teams will forget about the pick and roll and be forced to concentrate on how to eliminate the huge mismatches caused by our front line.
By creating height all around the rim, the layup line expressway, that has become legendary under Mike White’s tenure, will stop. No 6’1″ guard is going to keep trying his luck with a 6’11” 380 giant blocking his path. Jitoboh HAS TO get more time or the lay up assembly line will continue.
It appears that Castleton has a better perimeter shot than Payne so Castleton, with his surprising agility, will have to play small forward, and take the 8-12 foot jump or hook over a decisively smaller opponent every time he gets the ball. He is also a decent passer and so if defenses switch, he can get the ball to Payne or Jitoboh for a high percentage layup.